

IDEALIST

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17 October 1966

Deputy
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Special Activities

SUBJECT: Security of IDEALIST/TACKLE Missions

1. This paper is predicated upon the fact that recently there have been two instances where there have been indications of ChiCom prior awareness of reconnaissance missions. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Accordingly, this study of the procedures and practices associated with IDEALIST/TACKLE matters has been prepared and will primarily deal with the action which is taken in [REDACTED] upon receipt of a pre-mission alert.

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2. A review of files available within the Security Staff, OSA reflects that during the period April through June 1964, a task force was established to review certain problems regarding U-2's in [REDACTED] in an effort to determine whether a security penetration was responsible for a series of flameouts. The task force concluded that the problem at that time was technical in nature, however, during their inquiry, a complete review of the security aspects at [REDACTED] was made and included such major areas as personnel and physical security as well as the system of notification of pre-mission alerts. It was recognized then, that the pre-mission notifications offered the best opportunity for a penetration agent to notify the ChiComs of an impending mission thus giving them the opportunity to take necessary countermeasures to intercept the aircraft during the course of its operation. This vulnerability still exists today and the writer feels that a penetration agent's best chance of success to gain pre-mission knowledge rests in this area.

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3. As a result of the above cited task force's study, a further survey was conducted in January 1965. This survey revealed that once a mission has been planned by CIA Headquarters, the following organizations/components are alerted to the operation:

1. [REDACTED]

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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2. 25X1A
3. Joint Reconnaissance Center, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
4. Air Force Operations (AFXOPR) via AFSSO, USAF;
 - a. 5th Hqs. USAF, Fuchu, Japan;
 - b. JOC, Korea;
5. 25X1A
6.
7. Weather Central, SAC;
8. White House International Situation Center;
9. NPIC;
10. Eastman Kodak Co.;
11. AF/CIA Liaison;
12. NRO.

From the above, it can easily be seen that an extremely wide distribution or dissemination is made prior to the actual take off mission. The number of people within the various organizations/components listed who received pre-alert notification of an IDEALIST/TACKLE mission cannot be estimated at this juncture, however, the wide dissemination given to such information should be a genuine cause for concern.

4. To return to the basic purpose of this paper, regarding the action taken in upon receipt of a pre-mission notification, Headquarters concurrently alerts both and the Detachment Commander at approximately 30 hours prior to the mission take off. This alert information includes the target list as well as the coast-in/out points. Upon receipt of this information, the or his designee notifies the U.S. Ambassador and

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25X1 [] The latter will then approve or disapprove 25X1A
the mission with the [] notifying Head-
quarters accordingly. In addition, the [] 25X1A
also notifies the National Security Agency specialists 25X1A
in the area. The Detachment Commander [] upon 25X1A
receiving the pre-alert notification, calls the []
using a one time pad. In addition, [] 25X1A

25X1A [] are then briefed.
The actual mechanics of just how these briefings or notifi-
cations are made are unknown at this time. It is reasonable
to assume that after each of the above components are
briefed, the information is then further disseminated within
their respective offices as required.

5. Based upon the above, it is quite obvious that
in order to actually trace the flow of information down
the final recipient in each major component would require
a painstaking and detailed research in areas with sensitive
political implications.

6. Approximately 18 hours prior to a mission launch,
completely detailed information is forwarded from Head-
quarters to the Detachment Commander [] 25X1A
action is taken as required within [] 25X1A
itself.

7. Proceeding from the above, a variety of penetration
possibilities present themselves. First and possibly the
most vulnerable point lies in the use of various communica-
tions systems, i.e. telephone. As stated above, it is not
known by what means the various groups [] receive 25X1A
pre-mission alerts, but it can be reasonably assumed that
a certain amount of communication, pertinent to an impending
mission, does take place over the telephone. This is an
area which should at all times be closely monitored and
periodically inspected, where possible, together with a
continuing program of security awareness of the hazards 25X1
of carrying on classified conversations over the telephone

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8. A third possible area suggests itself as a means whereby the ChiComs are pre-alerted to a mission, and this lies in sheer deductive reasoning by which they could predict with some accuracy, the targets of interest and flight timing based on available weather data and their prior knowledge of previously scheduled missions. This latter could possibly explain the recent examples of ChiCom prior awareness.

9. In conclusion, the possibility of a ChiCom penetration of the IDEALIST/TACKLE program is entirely feasible and to think otherwise would be deluding oneself. Prior to submitting any recommendations or courses of action, this office is awaiting a reply to a cable request for [redacted] assessment of the situation particularly in light of the recent [redacted]

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[redacted]
Chief, Security Staff,
OSA

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Attachment: Flow Chart

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